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REVERSE REGULATORY ARBITRAGE: 
AN AUCTION APPROACH TO  
REGULATORY ASSIGNMENTS  
M. Todd Henderson and Frederick Tung* 
 
 In the years before the Financial Crisis, banks got to 
pick their regulators, engaging in a form of regulatory 
arbitrage that we now know was a race to the bottom. 
We propose to turn the tables on the banks by allowing 
regulators, specifically, bank examiners, to choose the 
banks they regulate. We call this “reverse regulatory 
arbitrage,” and we think it can help improve regulatory 
outcomes. Building on our prior work that proposes to 
pay bank examiners for performance—by giving them 
financial incentives to avoid bank failures—we argue 
that bank supervisory assignments should be set 
through an auction among examiners. Examiner bidding 
would generate information about examiners’ skills, ex-
perience and preferences, as well as information about 
each bank. Provided examiners bear the upside and 
downside of their regulatory behavior, a bidding system 
for regulatory assignments could improve the fit be-
tween examiners and the banks they supervise, thereby 
enhancing regulatory efficiency. 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago School of Law 
(toddh@uchicago.edu); and Howard Zhang Faculty Research 
Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law 
(fredtung@bu.edu), respectively.   
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2128823
DRAFT AUGUST 2, 2012 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 1 
A. WHY FIAT? ....................................................................................................... 1 
B. REVERSING REGULATORY ARBITRAGE ........................................................ 5 
II. THE THEORY OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION ............... 13 
A. MARKETS V. FIRMS ............................................................................... 14 
B. MARKET-HIERARCHY HYBRIDS ...................................................... 20 
C. RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN PRACTICE ........................................ 23 
III. BIDDING FOR BANKS .............................................................. 26 
A. NECESSARY CONDITION: SKIN IN THE GAME ........................... 27 
B. AUCTIONING OFF SUPERVISION RIGHTS .................................... 29 
C. IMPROVED MATCHING ......................................................................... 33 
1. Signaling Information and Skill ............................................... 34 
2. Countering Incumbent Bias ........................................................ 36 
D. THE ROLE OF DISCRETION ............................................................... 37 
1. Negotiated Procurement ................................................................. 38 
2. Application to Examiner Assignment .................................. 40 
IV. QUALIFICATIONS AND OBJECTIONS ............................ 41 
A. BIASES IN BIDDING AND BEYOND ................................................. 42 
B. PERVERSE BIDDING MOTIVATIONS ............................................... 45 
1. Bidding for the Revolving Door ................................................ 46 
2. Bidding for Inside Information ................................................. 49 
3. Bidding for Other Private Values ............................................ 50 
4. Collusive Bidding ................................................................................ 51 
C. EXAMINATION TEAM MICROSTRUCTURE .................................... 53 
D. WHY IT HAS NOT HAPPENED YET ................................................. 54 
E. THINKING BEYOND THE AGENCY ................................................... 55 
V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 57 
 
 
 
DRAFT AUGUST 2, 2012 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Why Fiat? 
A scarce resource, like labor, may be allocated in 
one of two ways: by the price mechanism or by fiat. 
With the price mechanism, the resource flows via mar-
ket transactions to where it is valued most highly. By 
contrast, fiat allocation occurs through the command 
of a person with authority within a hierarchy. All eco-
nomic activities face this choice of resource allocation 
mechanism, and all institutions—be they firms, fami-
lies, or governments—deploy a mix of these approach-
es. For example, the head of a family may want the 
grass cut. She has two basic choices: she can com-
mand that a family member cut the grass, or she can 
put the work out to bid among family members or 
landscaping companies. The choice will be determined 
by the relative costs and benefits of each approach. It 
is simple and cheap to direct a family member to do 
the work, but it might be done better or more efficient-
ly if put out to bid. 
As the costs of using market transactions fall (or 
rise) relative to the costs of fiat, the more (or less) work 
will be allocated by the price mechanism instead of fi-
at. Continuing with the grass-cutting example, if the 
costs of finding a landscaping service, evaluating the 
quality of the service, and negotiating an attractive 
price are lowered—say, because of the inception of an 
online marketplace for matching grass cutters and 
homeowners—then at the margin, families will be more 
likely to use a market than the fiat approach. 
The accepted practice across government is that 
regulatory resources, such as investigators or prosecu-
tors, are allocated by fiat by department or agency 
heads. Bank examiners are assigned to particular 
banks at the discretion of higher-level regulators in the 
agency hierarchy. Higher-ups in the agency decide 
2 HENDERSON AND TUNG   
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based on their judgment about things like skill, fit, 
work ethic, knowledge, and expertise. They must ad-
dress complicated tradeoffs, such as the risk of cap-
ture versus the benefits of experience from regulators 
working with the same firms year after year. One 
agency solution is to rotate regulators “periodically to 
ensure that an objective and fresh supervisory per-
spective is maintained."1 But there are downsides to  a 
fixed rotation system: knowing when one’s stake in a 
particular institution will end may provide opportuni-
ties to hide costs in future periods.2 In addition, the 
assignment process for bank examiners is completely 
opaque to outside observers. Although a great deal de-
pends on the efficient deployment of regulatory re-
sources, the public knows shockingly little about the 
process.3 
                                                 
1 See, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Large Bank 
Supervisory Handbook, available at  
http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/media/22019/occ-
comptr_handbook_large_bank_superv.pdf . See also "At the OCC, 
examiners in charge for each bank have contracts to cover a bank 
for up to five years. After that, they are rotated to another bank or 
assignment, which can mean a move to another city. We want to 
keep them fresh and learning. It's a very healthy thing to do. It's 
not always convenient for them." 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2011/07/10/2442855/financ
ial-crisis-lands-more-bank.html (quoting _______Brosnan, a long-
time OCC official). 
 2 For an example of this problem in another context, see Ami-
ty Shales, “China’s Katrina Shows Post-Communism No Big 
Easy,” BLOOMBERG, May 21, 2008 (“China intentionally rotates its 
governors to ensure they don't build up personal machines. Per-
versely, that freed officials from living with the consequences of 
shoddy construction. Soon after the ribbon is cut on the new 
school, they move on to the next post.”). 
3 Although there is no public disclosure concerning how 
these decisions are made or what factors inform them, we assume 
bank regulators—agencies like the Office of Comptroller of the 
Currency and the Federal Reserve—allocate regulatory resources 
based on assessments of fit, capability, and expertise, as well as 
the bank-specific information held by examiners. While we do not 
pooh-pooh the value of these judgments, considering alternative 
(continued next page) 
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We are unaware of any criticism of the fiat ap-
proach to regulatory resource deployment in the legal 
literature or elsewhere.4 This is surprising given the 
widespread existence of regulatory failures and the 
well-known pathologies of bureaucracies, particularly 
those relating to regulatory assignments. For example, 
regulatory capture is a serious concern, and assign-
ment schemes may have important consequences for 
combating or exacerbating capture. Our auction ap-
proach may make capture more difficult than under 
the current system of fiat assignment, where interest 
groups need only target the individuals responsible for 
assigning work in order to influence regulation. Under 
our approach, or in any hypothetical labor market 
within an agency, interest groups would have to influ-
ence all potential market participants.  
More generally, the fiat approach is a one-sided 
approach to a two-sided problem. Regulatory higher-
ups have information about examiner fit and capabil-
ity, but so do examiners. Insofar as the examiners 
cannot convey information relevant to setting regulato-
ry assignments, the matching of examiners to banks 
fails to utilize all of the information available. This 
problem affects all economic transactions, and auc-
tions are a well-accepted mechanism for aggregating 
and processing information, as well as generating effi-
                                                                                                             
assignment mechanisms may offer improvements in regulatory 
efficiency. Moreover, the lack of transparency about the process 
means other values, like managerial self interest, nepotism, polit-
ical favoritism, and so on, may be just as likely to inform alloca-
tion decisions. 
 4 The post-Financial Crisis reform proposals of academics, 
pundits, and legislators do not address regulatory assignment 
mechanisms, despite the fact that examiners were aware of but 
utterly failed to prevent enormous amounts of excessive risk in 
the banking system. While factors other than examiner assign-
ment methods were assigned undoubtedly played a large role in 
the crisis, we believe that misallocation of regulatory resources is 
a problem that must be addressed as well. 
4 HENDERSON AND TUNG   
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cient competition by buyers and sellers of the product 
or service in question. 
Our goal is two fold. First, we attempt to fill this 
gap in the literature by considering the costs and ben-
efits of the current approach to regulatory resource 
deployment. We develop a theory of regulatory re-
source allocation, pointing out the shortcomings of the 
pure fiat approach, as well as potential strengths. In 
light of recent regulatory failures, it is time to subject 
current examiner assignment methods to rigorous 
scrutiny.5  
Second, by using bank regulation as a sustained 
example, we propose a system of resource allocation 
pursuant to which examiners would bid for work at a 
particular bank. We argue that using price-based auc-
tions to inform the assignment of bank examiners 
would help reveal valuable information held within 
agencies but not readily available to higher-ups mak-
ing allocation decisions. Such as system would also 
serve as a self-correcting mechanism for the risks of 
the capture of individual examiners, as well as reveal 
valuable information about bank risk to agency man-
agers.  
Our proposal takes a page from private sector 
practices that muddy the classic Coasean firm-market 
dichotomy.6 A number of firms, recognizing the infor-
                                                 
5 Getting regulatory assignments right may be especially im-
portant in light of recent work on the problems inherent in the 
current regulatory approach to banking. See M. Todd Henderson 
& James Spindler, “Why Bank Regulation Failed . . . and Will 
Continue to Fail,” Working Paper, on file with authors. 
6
 In his work on the nature of the firm, Ronald Coase distin-
guished firms from markets, defining firms as loci where hierar-
chical commands effect transactions. Outside of the firm, by con-
trast—i.e., in markets—transactions are characterized by volun-
tary exchange. Ronald H. Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” 4 Eco-
nomica 386 (1937). Coase concluded that the firm’s boundary is 
determined based on where the net benefits of the fiat approach 
(such as simplicity) are outweighed by the net benefits of the price 
approach (such as information generation). Coase’s work gener-
(continued next page) 
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mation aggregation and matching potential of markets, 
have incorporated market mechanisms into their or-
ganizational decision making. Markets within hierar-
chies have emerged, and preliminary research largely 
confirms the promised benefits of the internal market-
based mechanisms.7 Internal prediction markets and 
job markets have improved forecasting and resource 
allocation within hierarchies. We propose bringing this 
private-sector learning to the government. 
 
B. Reversing Regulatory Arbitrage 
In the run-up to the Financial Crisis of 2007-
2008, banking regulation failed. Government post-
mortem reports on bank failures demonstrate wide-
spread regulatory failure.8 As we’ve show in prior work, 
bank examiners routinely identified fundamental 
weaknesses in banks many years before their collapse, 
yet failed to act aggressively enough to forestall prob-
lems that eventually led to disaster.9 For example, ex-
amination reports identified overly aggressive home 
mortgage origination practices at banks like Washing-
ton Mutual, but regulators failed to act because of the 
profits banks were making.10  
In Pay For Regulator Performance, we argued 
that one cause of this failure was the way bank exam-
iners are paid: low-powered incentives delinked from 
                                                                                                             
ates a prediction that as the costs of market transactions fall 
(rise) relative to the costs of fiat, more (less) work will be allocated 
by the price mechanism, instead of fiat. 
7 See infra Part II.B.__  
8
 We recognize there were many other types of failures that contributed to 
the Financial Crisis, and we do not believe it was solely a government problem. 
Our only claim is that regulatory failure contributed to the Crisis. 
9 For a discussion of the post-mortem accounts of bank fail-
ures, see M. Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, “Pay for Regula-
tor Performance,” __ S. CAL. L. REV.  __ (2012). 
10 Notwithstanding specific instructions not to do just this. 
See id at __. 
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desired outcomes yield low effort and misdirected 
work.11 In that paper, we recommend performance pay 
for examiners in the form of phantom debt and equity 
securities of the banks they regulate, as well as a spe-
cial takeover bonus tied to the timing of the decision to 
take over a failed bank.12 The idea is to link bank ex-
aminer compensation with desired social outcomes, so 
as to directly reward good regulatory outcomes and de-
ter bad ones.13 
While beneficial for incentivizing better perfor-
mance, incentive pay for examiners by itself cannot 
overcome allocative inefficiencies from command-and-
control assignments. Consider the well-known problem 
of regulatory capture. Many bank examiners work in-
tensely at one bank for long periods, and this can bias 
them. Some examiners may have been tempted to 
shade facts or forestall regulatory action because of a 
desire to avoid conflict with people the examiner 
knows well and works with on a daily basis. Some ex-
aminers may have been more interested in currying 
favor with the banks they regulated in hopes of en-
hancing future employment opportunities than in pur-
suing the public interest in safe and sound banking. If 
examiners bear the costs of regulatory laxity and these 
costs outweigh the personal gains, then this problem 
is reduced. But if pay and other work-related incen-
tives are insufficient to overcome this problem, then 
                                                 
11 See id at __. 
12 See id at __.  
13 The “optimal” social outcome here is a complicated thing to 
define in the abstract, but it involves the efficient amount of lend-
ing to the most desirable sectors of the economy. The efficient lev-
el of lending trades off the potential for increasing economic 
growth by increasing the velocity of money in the economy with 
the downside from losses caused by too much lending. See M. 
Todd Henderson & James Spindler, “Why Bank Regulation Failed 
. . . and Will Continue to Fail,” Working Paper (2012) (on file with 
author).  
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assignment issues become crucial.14 Even if forced to 
bear the downside of lax regulation, every regulator 
only operates with the limits of his or her knowledge, 
expertise, and awareness of the costs and benefits of 
various regulatory choices. An auction for regulatory 
services brings the views and information of many 
regulators to bear on the efficiency of regulatory as-
signments. 
Capture is not the only potential problem. If 
regulators are initially assigned based on favoritism, 
nepotism, politics, or other considerations unrelated to 
performance, even a well-designed incentive pay pro-
gram may not improve the quality of bank supervi-
sion.15 If bank examiners are mismatched with the 
banks they regulate, even well-intentioned, well-
incentivized examiners may perform poorly. This prob-
lem could be addressed to some extent by changing 
the incentives of those doing the assigning, but as dis-
cussed elsewhere, there may not be a reliable way to 
do this.16 Moreover, an auction system can simply be 
the other side of this two-sided problem. Because in-
centive pay structures will always be imperfect, the al-
location issue is an important compliment to any pay-
for-performance program. 
In this Paper, we argue that agencies should re-
place (or at least supplement) the fiat assignment ap-
proach to resource allocation with a price-based ap-
proach.17 Specifically, we propose an auction-based 
approach in which examiners would bid for regulatory 
                                                 
14 In addition, if agency higher-ups have perfect information 
about the risks of capture in every case and work rules do not 
prohibit resource allocation, then the problem is reduced. 
15 The problem is even more acute in the absence of an incen-
tive pay scheme. 
16 See Henderson & Tung, supra note __ at __. 
17 An (imperfect) model is the current government procure-
ment process, pursuant to which outside suppliers bid for gov-
ernment contracts.  
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assignments at particular banks.18 If examiners are 
forced to internalize the costs and benefits of their 
regulatory decisions, a well-designed assignment auc-
tion would generate information about individual ex-
aminers’ relative competencies for supervising particu-
lar banks. Auctions elicit better information about the 
most efficient allocation of regulatory resources than 
fiat. Better information would enable better matches 
between regulators and the regulated, as well as po-
tentially lowering the costs of effective regulation.  
Government agencies already use the price 
mechanism for some allocation decisions. Numerous 
agencies assign contracts to outside suppliers through 
competitive bidding. Instead of a government bureau-
crat simply commanding a lower-level bureaucrat (of 
her choosing) to perform a given task, tasks are de-
fined, put to bid, and assigned to the individual or en-
tity best able to perform the task.19 While not without 
its problems, this approach may also be fruitful in 
making internal assignments, since the costs and ben-
efits of work assignments are not fundamentally differ-
ent from other types of resource allocation questions.  
We recognize that supervisors making internal 
work assignments may have better information about 
the resources at hand than government procurement 
officers have when awarding outside contracts. We 
therefore do not propose that agencies make regulato-
ry assignments available to any willing bidder,20 or 
                                                 
18 Technically, our proposal is a reverse auction, where sellers 
of regulatory services (not buyers) compete for supervisory as-
signments. Bids decrease over time with a reverse auction, with 
the lower bidder winning the auction. 
19 By “best” we mean the examiner who can achieve the opti-
mal level of bank activity and risk taking at the lowest regulatory 
cost.  
20 As we discuss below, see infra Part IV.E, the more optimal 
the incentive compensation contract, the lower the costs of ex-
panding the range of potential examiners beyond a particular 
agency. 
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even that the lowest bid would necessarily always 
win,21 but simply that examiner assignments be based 
at least in part on a bidding process designed to match 
resources to their most efficient uses. Examiners may 
have valuable information about how resources should 
best be assigned that their bosses do not possess. An 
auction may help reveal this information. 
Just as prices in the economy aggregate and re-
veal information, so too can bidding for regulatory as-
signments. The prominent features of the price mech-
anism – transparency, comparison across providers, 
and continuous updating – may also foster competition 
among examiners. As a theoretical matter, competition 
for the provision of regulatory resources should be as 
effective and efficient as for the provision of any other 
resource, all else being equal. Admittedly, if social 
costs of behavior are not captured in the prices paid 
for regulation, then competition may not be welfare 
maximizing; this is the infamous race to the bottom. 
Accordingly, a crucial prerequisite to our proposed al-
location model is that regulators reap some of the 
gains and bear some of the losses from the quality of 
their work.22 If this condition obtains, as our examiner 
pay for performance proposal would accomplish, then 
bidding for assignments would reveal valuable infor-
mation that examiners possess but would otherwise be 
unable or unwilling to provide.  
                                                 
21 To assure open and competitive bidding for contracts, gov-
ernment procurement relies on two different approaches, depend-
ing on the circumstances: sealed bidding and competitive negotia-
tion. See Federal Acquisition Regulation, available at 
https://www.acquisition.gov/far/index.html. While sealed bid-
ding relies only on price and price-related factors in awarding 
contracts, competitive negotiation is appropriate when it may be 
necessary for contracting officers to conduct discussions with of-
ferors. See FAR 6.401(a). Non-cost factors may also play a role in 
determining which bid to accept. See id. 
22 See Henderson & Tung, “Pay for Regulator Performance,” 
supra note __ at ___. 
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 For instance, suppose Examiner 1 currently su-
pervises activities at National Bank, but Examiner 2 
believes that she is better able to bear the potential 
downside risk in compensation from a regulatory fail-
ure at National Bank or is better able to assess the 
risk at National Bank. There may be many reasons for 
this. Examiner 2 may have greater skill than Examiner 
1, but may not be able to readily convey this to those 
making regulatory assignments. (Such an outcome 
may be especially likely in the case where assignments 
are made based on non-performance-related factors, 
such as seniority.) Or Examiner 1 may be captured, 
and therefore unwilling to act as aggressively as she 
should.23 Or Examiner 2 may have better information 
about the risk posed by the activities of National Bank. 
In any of these situations, Examiner 2 may be able to 
outbid Examiner 1 for the assignment, since Examiner 
2 would be able to better value the costs and benefits 
of the assignment. Examiner 2’s low bid for the as-
signment reveals valuable information about the rela-
tive fit between the work to be done and Examiner 1 
versus Examiner 2.24  
In addition, the bidding may reveal private in-
formation held by the examiners as a group about the 
riskiness of particular banks. If individual risk aver-
sion and individual examiner quality are relatively 
                                                 
23 For example, if Examiner 1 wears rose-colored glasses 
about the risk of National Bank, she would underestimate the 
risk posed by the bank, and therefore, in the auction model we 
propose below, if Examiner 2 has a more realistic estimate of the 
risk, she would be able to outbid Examiner 1 for the work.  
 24 As noted above, this model of assignment only works if Ex-
aminer 2 gains or loses depending on her ability to deliver the op-
timal amount of regulation. For instance, if Examiner 2 stands to 
lose if National Bank engages in too much risk taking, then Ex-
aminer 2 has incentives to bake these losses into the price she is 
willing to pay to examine National Bank. If not, that is, if Examin-
er 2 is able to capture gains from winning the work but put the 
downside onto others, then her bid would not contain valuable 
information about her ability to achieve the social optimum.  
2012] REVERSE REGULATORY ARBITRAGE 11 
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constant through a bidding “season,” comparing the 
sets of bids for each bank should reflect a rough esti-
mate of the potential downside risk of taking on the 
work at the various banks. Since examiners may have 
good information about bank riskiness but imperfect 
mechanisms for conveying this information to higher-
ups in the regulatory agency, such a system may have 
the virtue of surfacing the information in more efficient 
ways.25  
One way of conceptualizing our proposal is what 
we call “reverse regulatory arbitrage,” that is, an anti-
dote of sorts to the possibility that banks might en-
courage lax regulation through regulatory arbitrage. 
Regulatory competition in banking is not new. For 
many years leading up to the Financial Crisis, and 
even today, banks effectively choose their regulator 
when they decide where to obtain a banking charter.26 
Regulators in turn had an incentive to design their 
regulatory environments with an eye to attracting 
banks in order expand the scope of their regulatory 
authority.27 This competition among regulators offered 
opportunities for banks to match their activities to the 
most suitably lenient regulator, thereby minimizing the 
                                                 
25 There are other ways of transmitting this information. Ex-
aminers could do it informally simply by communicating their 
views about the health of various banks throughout the agency. 
The incentives to do so may be absent some incentive, be it finan-
cial or otherwise. In fact, such behavior may be discouraged pre-
cisely because of the lack of a formal allocation system, since it 
may be viewed as undermining of other examiners. Alternatively, 
examiners could be permitted to trade in bank securities. This 
proposal suffers from numerous significant concerns, however, 
including legal ones having to do with insider trading and practi-
cal ones having to do with the fact that anonymous purchases or 
sales in the volumes examiners would trade are unlikely to move 
market prices. An internal auction system avoids these problems. 
26 See, e.g., John A. Weinberg, Competition Among Bank Regu-
lators, 88 FED. RES. BANK OF RICHMOND ECON. QUART. 19 (2002). 
27 See id. 
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regulatory constraints on their business models.28 
Regulation was unsuccessful in forcing banks to fully 
internalize the downside of their risk taking, which 
suggests that this competition was a race to the bot-
tom for regulatory oversight.29 (One reason the race 
among regulators was to the bottom instead of the top 
is because regulatory agencies did not internalize the 
full costs of their regulatory choices.) 
Our proposal seeks to turn the tables on the 
banks. Instead of permitting banks to choose their 
regulators, we propose to let examiners choose their 
banks.30 Examiners would compete for the banks they 
wish to supervise, and they would do so through the 
price mechanism. Essentially, we would auction off the 
supervisory rights over individual banks, so that 
banks would be matched with examiners who could 
maximize banks’ regulatory value, thereby optimizing 
regulatory resource allocation. Assuming regulators 
would bear the downside of their own regulatory laxity 
and the upside of their regulatory efficiency—through 
an incentive pay scheme we have described elsewhere, 
for example—this race would be toward the top and 
not the bottom.  
To make our core argument, we proceed as fol-
lows. In Part II, we describe the basic theory of re-
source allocation. We show how the price mechanism 
is an alternative to command-and-control in the area 
of regulatory resource deployment, and argue that the 
benefits of using this method may exceed the costs in 
a range of contexts. Part III then applies this thinking 
to the case of bank examiners. In this part, we propose 
                                                 
28 See, e.g., Chana Joffe-Walt, “Regulating AIG: Who Fell 
Asleep On the Job?,” NPR, June 5, 2009, available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1049795
46.   
29 See id. 
30 So our focus is not on competition among regulatory agen-
cies. Instead, we propose competition among examiners within a 
given agency. 
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a  price-based auction for use in assigning bank regu-
lators to supervisor specific banks. Part IV raises and 
answers some potential objections, such as the revolv-
ing door problem and issues about manipulation.  
 
II. THE THEORY OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
Our proposal is well grounded in both theory 
and practice outside of the regulatory context. Over 
seventy years ago, Ronald Coase explained why re-
sources are sometimes allocated by fiat—typically 
within a firm hierarchy—and sometimes allocated 
through the price mechanism—typically through mar-
ket transactions.31 Market pricing coordinates eco-
nomic interaction by revealing private information, but 
fiat is the more efficient mechanism when the transac-
tion costs of using prices are sufficiently large.32 For 
instance, photocopying tasks for a business could per-
haps be performed most efficiently if assigned through 
competitive bidding (either inside or outside the firm), 
but the costs of such an assignment system would 
likely swamp any gains from improved performance of 
the task.33   
In this Part, we present the basic theory of re-
source allocation, as it applies to regulatory resources. 
We first contrast prototypical markets with hierarchies 
as mechanisms for resource allocation. We then de-
scribe the recent organizational innovation of internal 
market-hybrid arrangements. Firms have recently be-
gun to experiment with customized internal market 
mechanisms in order to marshal markets’ informa-
tional and matching advantages for organizational de-
                                                 
31 See Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” supra note __ at ___. 
32 See id. Coase defined a “firm” as the locus of decisions in 
which this latter condition obtained.  
33 The growth of the photocopying industry outside of firms, 
as seen in firms like Kinkos, demonstrates that for certain as-
signments, the market for photocopies may be a valuable source 
of efficiency. 
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cision making. This hybrid approach best characteriz-
es our auction proposal for examiner assignments. We 
then explain how regulatory resources are allocated in 
practice. 
 
A. Markets v. Firms 
Every organization, be it a country, a firm, a 
family, or an administrative agency, has to decide how 
to allocate its resources to achieve its goals. For hu-
man capital allocation, the choice might involve who 
will cut the grass, manage a new factory, or regulate a 
particular bank. Whether the task is large or small, 
complex or mundane, important or trivial, a decision 
must be made about who will perform the task and 
how she will do it.  
Market allocations are made using the price 
mechanism. Buyers and sellers are matched at mutu-
ally beneficial terms by reducing their preferences to a 
single price at which they are willing to buy or sell. 
Although probably not common, it is not difficult to 
imagine families auctioning off chore assignments. 
More commonly, consider a business deciding which 
law firm should defend it in a lawsuit. The company 
would solicit “bids” from various firms – that is, the 
prices at which the firms would perform the work – 
and, based on price and other factors, choose a coun-
sel.34 The company could open the bidding up to both 
internal and external lawyers. 
Fiat, on the other hand, works based on hierar-
chy.35 Those higher up in a hierarchy make decisions 
about who will do what. In the family example, the 
head of the family simply chooses who will cut the 
                                                 
34 As the law firm example suggests, such market transac-
tions may involve negotiated agreements, in addition to the tradi-
tional continuous double-blind auctions of spot markets. 
35 The hierarchy could be created in a number of ways—by 
contract, custom, or social norms, for example. 
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grass, presumably backed up by sanctions for non-
compliance, like grounding or withholding of an allow-
ance. This is the way chores are typically allocated, 
and thus familial resources deployed.36 Businesses 
typically use this approach for marshalling their em-
ployees to work, and some countries have even used 
this approach to allocate all resources within an econ-
omy. In the lawsuit example, the CEO could simply 
command the general counsel to represent the compa-
ny in the litigation. 
As Coase noted,37 markets and hierarchies each 
have their costs and benefits, and we should expect 
the pattern of organizations’ choices to reflect the net 
of these. When the costs of using the price mechanism 
exceed the benefits, we see allocations made through 
command-and-control structures, and vice versa.38 For 
                                                 
36 As explored below, however, fiat-based decisions necessarily 
involve estimates of the costs and benefits of particular work as-
signments, and, knowing this, potential assignees will want to try 
to influence the decision by signaling something about their effi-
ciency at doing the work. For instance, a family member who real-
ly dislikes grass cutting may complain or do a terrible job, thus 
trying to convey their “price” to the decision maker. 
37 Coase defines a “firm” where the locus of command and 
control stops and allocation via the price mechanism starts. See 
Coase, “Nature of the Firm,” supra note __ at __. In Coase’s ac-
count, if a family or firm puts out the grass-cutting work to bid, 
the winner of the bid, say a local landscaping business, is outside 
the family or firm. See id. For instance, Apple Computer has other 
companies bid for the work assembling Apple’s products, rather 
than vertically integrating this work within Apple’s command-
and-control hierarchy. Decisions about who will work on the de-
sign of the latest Apple phone, however, are made by managers 
based on their assessment of capability, fit, interest, politics, and 
so on. 
38 Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which 
is coordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the 
market. Within a firm, these market transactions are eliminated 
and in place of the complicated market structure with exchange 
transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-coordinator, who 
directs production. 
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instance, if we observe that a business sources its 
photocopying tasks internally by fiat but sources the 
supply of copy paper by price, we can fairly assume 
that the potential efficiency gains from using a market 
mechanism are worth the cost in the latter case but 
not in the former.39 
Markets offer high-powered incentives for actors 
to get their allocation decisions right. Competition 
among buyers or sellers offers the potential for rich 
rewards to skill and skill acquisition, innovation, hard 
work, and information acquisition. Conversely, lack of 
success in the competition can lead to lost business 
and customers. The potentially rich rewards also at-
tract new entrants, drawing talent to areas of market 
need.40 Markets also encourage individuals to produce 
and reveal information that might otherwise be diffi-
cult to obtain. Thomas Sowell summarizes nicely how 
the price mechanism can efficiently aggregate, process, 
and reveal valuable information held by all individu-
als—what F.A. Hayek called “tacit knowledge.”41 Sowell 
writes: 
 
                                                 
39 Coase’s insight was to predict that the boundary of institu-
tions, like business firms, would change over time to reflect the 
relative costs and benefits of fiat versus command and control. In 
times, industries, or situations in which hierarchy is more effi-
cient than price, businesses or governments or agencies will ex-
pand to conduct more activity internally. When markets are more 
efficient, by contrast, organizations will contract the scope of their 
internal activities and increase their reliance on external markets. 
[cite] The secular trend seems to be in the direction of the use of 
more market mechanisms for allocating resources. Outsourcing, 
whether it is of janitorial services, manufacturing, legal services, 
or any other functions historically performed within the bounda-
ries of a firm, is the most familiar modern example of Coase’s in-
sight and this trend. 
40 Todd. R. Zenger, Teppo Felin & Lyda Bigelow, Theories of 
the Firm-Market Boundary, 5 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 89, 96 (2011).   
41 See F. A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT (1988). 
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Knowledge is one of the scarcest of all re-
sources and a pricing system economizes 
on its use by forcing those with the most 
knowledge of their own particular situa-
tion to make bids for goods and resources 
based on that knowledge, rather than on 
their ability to influence other people in 
planning commissions, legislatures, or 
royal palaces.42 
Related to information revelation and aggrega-
tion, markets facilitate matching and sorting. Especial-
ly in labor markets, which are populated with hetero-
geneous buyers and sellers, matching is an important 
market function. “The broadcasting of information in 
markets provides an opportunity to make valuable 
comparisons across a set of alternatives, prices and 
possibilities, and then make matches accordingly.”43 
Managers or other purchasers of complex services is-
sue requests for proposals, while service providers bid 
for projects based not only on price but also on the ba-
sis of their heterogeneous skill sets, experience, repu-
tations, and so on. 
Markets may not always work well, however. 
Market mechanisms require accurate prices, and price 
discovery is a potentially costly exercise.44 The price 
mechanism might also require extensive contracting. 
Especially in labor markets, if projects are complex, 
long lasting, and require specialized skills, the trans-
action costs of negotiating and writing these contracts 
may be prohibitive. In addition, some actors may pre-
                                                 
42 THOMAS SOWELL, BASIC ECONOMICS (2007) (emphasis sup-
plied). 
43 Teppo Felin & Todd R. Zenger, Information Aggregation, 
Matching and Radical Market-Hierarchy Hybrids: Implications for 
the Theory of the Firm, 9 STRATEGIC ORGANIZATION 163, 167 (2011). 
44  Most static economic models assume all individuals know 
all prices, but this is not a realistic assumption when considering 
costs of setting up a market. 
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fer long-term contracts for reasons beyond the costs of 
contracting (e.g., risk allocation), and writing multiple 
contracts over time may not deliver those benefits. 
There may also be tax or regulatory provisions that 
make a single fiat decision superior to multiple price-
based contracts.45 
Assignment by fiat, by contrast, has low trans-
actions costs once a firm’s hierarchy is built. At that 
point, the choice about who should perform a task can 
be as simple as choosing. Defining a task, putting it 
out to bid, evaluating bids, and then engaging in ex-
tensive contracting are not required, as they are in 
markets. To be sure, decision makers deploying a 
command-and-control process may invest in infor-
mation about the optimal resource allocation, but de-
cisions can be made quickly and simply. Especially 
when there may be few people capable of doing the 
work, the stakes are low, the decider has good infor-
mation about the expected quality of the work, moni-
toring is easy, and/or incentives for good work are 
strong, assignment by fiat may be superior to market 
transactions. 
On the other hand, when one or more of these 
conditions do not hold, market pricing may be more 
efficient at matching workers with particular tasks 
they can do well or risks they can bear well. With allo-
cation by fiat, employees incur influence costs, hoping 
to win a particular assignment by winning over the 
boss with nonprice signals, like jawboning, making 
friends, persuasion, or the like. More generally, fiat-
based decisions are less transparent than price-based 
decisions. Such decisions and their consequences may 
therefore enjoy less legitimacy both within and outside 
an organization. If a manager chooses A over B for an 
                                                 
45 For instance, sales and other transaction taxes apply to 
some transactions considered outside of the firm, while certain 
employment rules apply to some transactions considered inside of 
the firm. 
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assignment in a non-market environment, B may be-
lieve that A was chosen for reasons other than efficien-
cy, such as nepotism, bias (e.g., race, gender, class, or 
politics), favoritism, and so on. Whether true or not, 
this may undermine the legitimacy of other managerial 
decisions and may reduce the productivity of both A 
and B, as well as other workers.46 With market alloca-
tion, workers can simply put their money where their 
mouth is to reveal their private information about the 
costs of their doing the work. So long as wealth con-
straints do not exist (something discussed more be-
low), the price mechanism is unbiased. It also facili-
tates straightforward comparison. If designed properly, 
price allocation reflects the social value of the work ra-
ther than private values that decision makers maxim-
ize by using nonprice allocation criteria. 
Fiat has other drawbacks as well. There are di-
minishing marginal returns of management efficiency. 
As the size of an organization and its activity levels in-
crease, the transaction costs of fiat-based resource al-
locations rise. Information demands grow, as does the 
expertise required of decision makers. Authorities re-
quire information about both projects and all potential 
workers, and as the quantum of required information 
aggregates across a larger and larger organization, 
costs can rise exponentially. As Coase explained, at 
some point, the inefficiencies from resource allocation 
by fiat can be expected to equal (and then exceed) the 
transaction costs of using the price mechanism. At 
that point, we would expect to see greater resort to the 
price mechanism and market allocation. 
 
                                                 
46 Similarly, in the case of a regulatory agency, without an ob-
jective metric for allocating regulatory resources, outside stake-
holders—members of Congress or the general public, for exam-
ple—may view the outcomes of the regulatory process as less le-
gitimate. 
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B. Market-Hierarchy Hybrids 
Markets and firms merely delineate the polar 
cases in the spectrum of choices available to those re-
sponsible for allocating scarce resources, and Coase’s 
dichotomous view of markets versus firms has broken 
down in the face of organizational innovation. We ob-
serve efforts to design “internal hybrid” market mech-
anisms in order to reap the benefits that Coase de-
scribed for markets generally, but based within hierar-
chical structures. Following on the success of public 
information markets at predicting event outcomes, 
firms have created highly specialized internal markets 
to elicit and aggregate information from employees, 
both to improve internal forecasting and decisionmak-
ing and to allocate resources.  
The most famous set of prediction markets is the 
Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM), which offers the oppor-
tunity to essentially bet on the outcomes of U.S. Presi-
dential and Congressional elections, as well as a host 
of other issues of wide public interest.47 IEM election 
markets are set up as futures markets, trading con-
tracts whose payoffs depend on the outcome of future 
events. The original IEM election market, set up in 
1988, focused on the Bush-Dukakis Presidential race, 
trading contracts that would pay 2-1/2 cents for each 
percentage point of the popular vote ultimately ob-
tained by a given candidate in the general election.48 
Fluctuating trading prices for Bush or Dukakis con-
tracts would therefore reflect popular sentiment about 
the election’s outcome. 
                                                 
47 Other IEM markets include the Federal Reserve Monetary 
Policy Market and the 2012 Republican Nomination Market. See 
Iowa Electronic Markets, available at  
http://tippie.uiowa.edu/iem/index.cfm (last visited June 8, 
2012).  
48 Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, 18 J. 
ECON. PERSP., 107, 110 (2004). 
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Prediction markets like IEM have bested expert 
opinion in their predictive accuracy in a variety of con-
texts, including elections,49 the performance of Holly-
wood films (both in awards and box office receipts),50 
and the winners of NFL games.51 These successes en-
couraged private companies to construct their own in-
ternal prediction markets. Hewlett-Packard, an early 
adopter, found that employees trading in their internal 
prediction market generated more accurate forecasts 
of printer sales than the firm’s bureaucracy.52 Google 
runs dozens of internal markets to forecast product 
demand, internal performance, and industry events.53 
In addition to predicting events, firms use inter-
nal markets to allocate resources, including labor. 
                                                 
49 See id. See also Joyce Berg, Robert Forsythe, and Forrest 
Nelson, “Results from a Dozen years of election Futures Markets 
Research,” in Handbook of Experimental Economic Results. 
Charles Plott and Vernon Smith, eds. Amsterdam: Elsevier; Joyce 
Berg, Forrest Nelson, and Thomas Rietz, 2006. “Accuracy and 
Forecast StandardError in Prediction Markets,” mimeo, University 
of Iowa; Joyce Berg and Thomas Rietz, “The Iowa Electronic Mar-
ket: Lessons Learned and Answers Yearned,” in Information Mar-
kets: A New Way of Making Decisions in the Public and Private 
Sectors, ed. Robert Hahn and Paul Tetlock, AEIBrookings Joint 
Center, Washington D.C. (2006). 
50 David Pennock, Steve Lawrence, Finnrup Nielsen and C. 
Lee Giles, “Extracting Collective Probabilitistic Forecasts from 
Web Games,” in Proceedings of the Seventh ACM SIGKDD Inter-
national Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, 
174-183 (2001). 
51 Emile Servan-Schreiber, Justin Wolfers, David Pennock and 
Brian Galebach, “Prediction Markets: Does Money Matter?” Elec-
tronic Markets, 14(3), 243-251 (2004). 
52 Kay-Yut Chen and Charles Plott, “Information Aggregation 
Mechanisms:Concept, Design and Implementation for a Sales 
Forecasting Problem,” CalTech (2002). 
53 Cowgill, Wolfers & Zitzewitz_Google at 6 & tbl. 1. Google al-
so runs “fun” markets, focusing on topics with no direct relation 
to its business but which might be interesting or entertaining for 
its employees—e.g., gas prices or the quality of Stars Wars Epi-
sode III). These fun markets may improve liquidity in the busi-
ness-related markets. Id.  
22 HENDERSON AND TUNG   
DRAFT AUGUST 2, 2012 
British Petroleum has used internal electronic trading 
to allocate carbon dioxide emission permits among 
business units.54 Intel has experimented with internal 
markets to allocate manufacturing capacity, allowing 
plant managers, sales representatives and other em-
ployees to trade futures contracts for specific prod-
ucts.55 Hewlett-Packard has experimented with infor-
mal internal markets for assigning workers to pro-
jects.56 Researchers have also modeled internal alloca-
tion markets, identifying design features important to 
their success.57 
“[I]nternal hybrids are fundamentally attempts 
to mimic, inside the hierarchy, the decentralization of 
decision and income rights that characterize the mar-
ket in an attempt to improve the efficiency of processes 
of discovering, creating, and using knowledge.”58  As 
Coase noted, markets offer high-powered incentives to 
gather information and use it efficiently. Within con-
ventional hierarchies, by contrast, information and de-
cision making authority might not always be found in 
the same place. Lower-level employees typically hold 
specialized knowledge about their work environment 
that higher-ups have no way of accessing. Internal 
markets can help merge that knowledge with decision 
                                                 
54 Thomas W. Malone, Bringing the Market Inside, HARV. BUS. 
REV. 107 (Apr. 2004). 
55 Id. at 110; David McAdams & Thomas W. Malone, Internal 
Markets for Supply Chain Capacity Allocation 6 (MIT Sloan Work-
ing Paper 2005). 
56 Malone, supra note 54, at 109. 
57 Stanley Baiman, Paul Fischer, Madhav V. Rajan & Richard 
Saouma, Resource Allocation Auctions within Firms, 45 J. ACCTG. 
RSC. 915 (2007); McAdams & Malone, supra note 55; James B. 
Bushnell & Shmuel S. Oren, Internal Auctions for the Efficient 
Sourcing of Intermediate Products, 12 J. OPER. MGMT. 311 (1995). 
58 Nicolai J. Foss, Selective Intervention and Internal Hybrids: 
Interpreting and Learning from the Rise and Decline of the Oticon 
Spaghetti Organization, 14 ORG. SCI. 331, 336 (May-June 2003). 
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rights, as well as offering high-powered incentives to 
induce efficient use of that knowledge.59 
Our auction proposal does just that. It serves to 
collocate information and decision rights by delegating 
authority to lower-level employees. In our case, bank 
examiners enjoy authority to influence their work as-
signments through their auction bids. In addition, the 
high-powered incentives that come with bank debt-
equity portfolios assure that examiners would make 
efficient use of these decision rights. This complemen-
tarity between new high-powered incentives and newly 
assigned decision rights for examiners may result in a 
more efficient allocation of human capital.60 
 Before we turn to our specific proposal for auc-
tioning examiner assignments, it is worth considering 
how bank examiners and other regulatory resources 
are currently deployed.  
 
C. Resource Allocation in Practice 
Bank examiners are assigned to supervise par-
ticular banks through the dictate of their superiors in 
the regulatory hierarchy,61 based on supervisors’ 
judgment about things like skill, fit, work ethic, 
knowledge, and expertise. There is much to be said for 
such discretionary, non-price-based determinations. 
Allocators may have good information about optimal 
allocation decisions given their personal knowledge 
                                                 
59 For a general discussion of potential applications of predic-
tion markets in law, see Michael Abramowitz & M. Todd Hender-
son, Prediction Markets for Corporate Governance, 82 N.D. LAW 
REV. 1343 (2007). 
60 See id. at 337 (discussing the importance of organizational 
complementarities). 
61 For example, at the Office of Comptroller of the Currency, 
“examiners in charge for each bank have contracts for up to five 
years,” and assignments are made by fiat. See, e.g., 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2011/07/10/2442855/financ
ial-crisis-lands-more-bank.html 
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and experience, be it individual or institutional. More-
over, if examiners do not bear the costs of their social-
ly suboptimal decisions, then putting more power in 
their hands to decide their work makes little sense.62 A 
hierarchical system also may have clear lines of au-
thority, which make decisions simple and accountabil-
ity for mistakes (theoretically) clear.  
But this depends entirely on the incentives of 
deciders and the quality and cost of their information. 
For example, when making assignments, agency heads 
must address complicated tradeoffs, such as the risk 
of capture versus experience benefits from regulators 
working with the same banks year after year. Though 
periodic rotation of examiners helps maintain objec-
tivity and fresh eyes,63 this benefit must be weighed 
against the costs of forced rotation, which include the 
loss of information and expertise, transition costs for 
examiners,64 and the potential for any rule to be over- 
or under-inclusive. The optimal rotation schedule may 
be difficult to discern, which takes us back to the in-
centives of deciders. The public has almost no infor-
mation about these incentives, about how the tradeoffs 
are managed, and about the initial allocation deci-
sions. Our proposal attempts to optimize the tradeoff 
with more information, continuously, and at a bank- 
and examiner-specific level. 
More generally, next to nothing is known about 
how the federal government’s vast resources are de-
ployed. Despite this dearth of information, there are 
good reasons to believe that resources may be allocat-
ed in inefficient ways. For instance, like nearly all fed-
                                                 
 62 For instance, it would be inadvisable to allow examiners to 
pick the banks they regulate if examiners choose banks based on 
future employment prospects with those banks. Banks might, for 
example, offer post-government jobs in exchange for lax oversight. 
63 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
64 It's not always convenient for them."-
  http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2011/07/10/2442855/fina
ncial-crisis-lands-more-bank.html 
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eral employees, bank regulators are paid almost exclu-
sively with cash salaries and cannot routinely be fired. 
In addition, the revolving-door problem and regulatory 
capture are well known problems, and there is abun-
dant evidence, both recent and historical, of regulatory 
failure. All of this gives reason to worry about the effi-
cacy of resource deployment. 
There is also little oversight. Administrative 
agencies publish budgets and some self-serving sum-
maries of actions taken, but little else. To take just one 
example, during the height of the recent finance bub-
ble, bank regulatory agencies paid over $20 million in 
cash bonuses to bank examiners, but we know noth-
ing about the individual recipients, the metrics used to 
allocate the bonuses, or anything else about how ex-
aminers were assigned to banks.65 Regulatory re-
sources may be allocated in ways that are not neces-
sarily aligned with social welfare, but we have no way 
of knowing. 
As we discuss in the next Part, things may 
change if we modify the compensation scheme so that 
examiners bear economic consequences from their de-
cision making. Paying examiners with the debt and 
equity of the banks they regulate gives examiners a 
stake in their own performance, causing a shift in the 
costs and benefits of using prices to allocate regulatory 
resources. Costs are reduced because examiners now 
have stronger incentives to accurately and judiciously 
bid for their supervisory assignments, given the effect 
of assignment on their personal wealth. At the very 
least, such a system would vastly increase the trans-
parency of the regulatory resource allocation process, 
and this may alone be worth the costs of such a sys-
tem. 
 
                                                 
65 See, Henderson & Tung, “Pay for Regulator Performance,” 
supra note __ at __. 
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III. BIDDING FOR BANKS 
In this Part, we describe what an assignment 
auction might look like. As implied by our earlier dis-
cussion of internal market hybrids,66 we do not pro-
pose the auction system as a complete replacement for 
the current mechanism of resource allocation. Instead, 
we view it as a crucial allocative mechanism within an 
organizational framework of fiat decisionmaking, in the 
same way that specialized internal markets within pri-
vate firms are used to allocate resources and improve 
decisionmaking. Prices offer valuable information that 
can complement nonprice mechanisms. At the same 
time, nonprice factors may matter, and errors or bias-
es may mar the auction process. For example, agency 
heads may rightly be concerned about the winner’s 
curse or optimism bias on the part of examiners. Or 
certain examiners might harbor perverse bidding in-
centives.67 Internal markets, like other markets, may 
require market regulators.68 Agency heads may there-
fore wish to retain some amount of discretion to con-
sider nonprice factors as well as bidding outcomes, an 
arrangement that is a common feature of the bidding 
process for both government and private contracts.   
More generally, the structural details of any 
price-based system will be crucial to its success, and 
agency heads and other experts are far better posi-
tioned to design and implement the system than we 
are. Who may bid, how the bidding runs, how the bid-
ding interacts with compensation, what nonprice fac-
tors are relevant to assignment decisions, and so on, 
will need to be worked out over time. For now, we pro-
pose a basic framework for our auction mechanism, 
and we outline a structure for constrained discretion 
                                                 
66 See supra Part II.B. 
67 We discuss these possibilities in Part IV infra. 
68 Thomas W. Malone, THE FUTURE OF WORK 103 (2004) (dis-
cussing the organization of internal markets). 
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as part of the allocation process. Our specific focus is 
the “examiner in charge”—the senior examiner who 
leads the examination team at the bank. For large 
banks, this senior examiner is a permanent fixture at 
the bank. She supervises that single bank as her full-
time job. She has offices and support staff at the bank, 
and she spends a fair part of her working life at the 
bank.69 
Section A describes a critical precondition to our 
auction proposal—that examiners have skin in the 
regulatory game by holding debt and equity securities 
of the banks they regulate. Section B describes the 
mechanics of our reverse auction. Section C elaborates 
the advantages of our approach. Section D explains 
the role of supervisors’ discretion in our examiner as-
signment scheme. 
 
A. Necessary Condition: Skin in the Game 
 A prerequisite to an auction system is that ex-
aminers have skin in the regulatory game. They must 
enjoy some of the upside and suffer some of the down-
side of their good and bad regulatory decisions. Oth-
erwise there will be little (social) gain or loss from their 
assignment to any particular bank, and therefore no 
valuable motivation behind the decision to bid for one 
bank assignment or the other. Without bearing the 
consequences from regulatory decisions, auctioning 
could be perverse, since examiners’ bids would reflect 
values personal to them that would diverge from social 
welfare values from regulation. For instance, an exam-
iner might prefer working with Bank A instead of Bank 
B because the examiner thought Bank A was less work 
to supervise, preferred the geographical location of 
Bank A, enjoyed the people or coffee at Bank A more, 
or any number of factors irrelevant to regulatory goals. 
                                                 
69 We discuss issues of examination team microstructure in 
the next Part. 
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If such personal values would spur an examiner to 
outbid her competitors for the assignment, independ-
ent of the skill or fit of the examiner, then the result 
could be worse regulation.70 
 Researchers have recognized the crucial role of 
compensation schemes in determining players’ prefer-
ences in internal markets.71 In essence, the efficiency 
of the market depends on the design of the internal in-
centive system. In an earlier paper, Pay for Regulator 
Performance, we suggested a system of incentive pay 
for bank examiners. Independent of work assignments, 
but purely as an incentive device for conscientious 
regulation, we argued that an examiner should be paid 
in part with a debt-heavy portfolio of phantom debt 
and equity securities of the bank she regulates.72 
Holding periods for the portfolio would assure that the 
examiner would embrace a medium- to long-term per-
spective in her regulatory decision making. For exam-
ple, the examiner would not be shy about exposing ex-
cessively risky practices at her bank for fear of short-
term drops in the prices of the bank’s securities, since 
any gains or losses would only be measured over a pe-
riod of years. Instead, her decision making would con-
sider the long-term interests of the bank, and indirect-
                                                 
70 This assumes that social welfare impact of regulatory as-
signment is taken into account somewhat in a non-auction allo-
cation system. If it isn’t, then the auction system without skin in 
the game might be no worse. 
71 Baiman, et al., supra note 57, at 916. 
72 Because the trading price of public debt is sensitive to the 
downside risk of its issuer, the debt portion of the examiner’s 
portfolio would give the examiner a personal stake in curbing ex-
cessive risk taking at the bank. The smaller equity portion of the 
portfolio would guard against excessive risk aversion by the ex-
aminer. Henderson & Tung, “Pay for Regulator Performance,” su-
pra note __ at 138. The portfolio would only form a part of an ex-
aminer’s annual compensation, id. at 135; and it would use 
“phantom” securities—essentially contractual rights to payment 
based on the gains and losses of the underlying publicly traded 
securities. Id. at 139.  
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ly, the public interest. With an economic stake in the 
eventual outcome of her regulatory decisions, the ex-
aminer would have an incentive to more actively and 
carefully monitor the bank for which she is responsi-
ble.  
With this as a starting point—that examiner pay 
would vary with regulatory outcomes based on bank-
specific debt-equity portfolios—our auction proposal 
further capitalizes on these new incentives to improve 
regulatory resource allocation.  We use these bank 
debt-equity portfolios as auction currency as well as 
performance incentives, inducing each examiner to 
value her potential regulatory assignments and there-
by signal her individual skills, information, and prefer-
ences with respect to each assignment. The overall re-
sult, we hope, is the improved matching of regulators 
to the regulated. 
 
B. Auctioning Off Supervision Rights 
 The central feature of our reverse auction pro-
posal is that for a given bank, examiners would bid by 
specifying the lowest-value package of that bank’s debt 
and equity securities (the “auction portfolio”) they 
would be willing to accept to supervise that bank. Su-
pervisors would set the parameters of the initial auc-
tion portfolio before the auction—the debt-equity ratio 
of the portfolio and its starting value, for instance—
and examiners would then bid by competitive dis-
counting of this initial auction portfolio. Agencies 
would conduct auctions for each regulated bank, spec-
ifying the composition and value of the initial auction 
portfolio for each bank, as well as other auction rules. 
Higher-ups might decide for a given bank that 
the appropriate value for the initial auction portfolio 
should be $100, with a debt-equity ratio of 3:1—$75 of 
bank debt securities and $25 of bank equity at current 
30 HENDERSON AND TUNG   
DRAFT AUGUST 2, 2012 
market prices.73 These details might be based on expe-
rience with other similarly situated banks, the specific 
details of this bank, the current economic times, or 
other factors. Whatever the basis, an examiner espe-
cially confident in her ability to add regulatory value to 
that bank would be willing to take a larger discount on 
the proposed $100 initial auction portfolio than other 
regulators because she would be better able to en-
hance the value of the portfolio than others. Her low 
bid would signal this potential for regulatory value 
added, and she should be assigned to supervise that 
bank. 
Competitive discounting from the initial auction 
portfolio could take two forms. Examiners could either 
bid with real dollars (“cash bidding”), or they could bid 
by stating the minimum percentage of the initial auc-
tion portfolio they would accept to supervise the bank 
(“portfolio bidding”). With cash bidding, each examiner 
essentially offers to purchase the regulatory assign-
ment, with 100 percent of the initial auction portfolio 
as her incentive pay package. With portfolio bidding, 
the winning bidder would win the assignment by ac-
cepting the smallest percentage of the initial auction 
portfolio as her incentive pay.  
In either case, the bidding would demonstrate 
examiners’ relative confidence in adding value to the 
bank through effective regulation, with the winning bid 
exhibiting the most promise. For instance, if a bidding 
examiner believed on this portfolio that her marginal 
regulatory contribution would be to raise the value of 
the firm’s debt by $25 over the course of her assign-
ment, then she would be willing to bid up to $125 in 
cash for the $100 portfolio of the bank’s phantom cap-
ital structure. This is because the examiner would ex-
                                                 
73 Our proposal for performance pay is to pay regulators with 
equity in the bank holding company, for reasons discussed in 
Henderson & Tung, “Pay for Regulator Performance,” supra note 
__ at __. 
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pect the value of the portfolio to be at least $125 at the 
end of the period. This examiner would win out over 
an examiner who thought that his marginal contribu-
tion was anything less than $25. 
It is difficult to tell in the abstract whether port-
folio or cash bidding would be superior or whether 
there is a general answer to the question of which is 
the better approach. Each approach has benefits and 
costs, and these are unlikely to be constant over time, 
across regulators, or across banks. But it may be 
worthwhile to sketch out potential advantages and 
disadvantages of the different approaches.  
Portfolio bidding has one distinct advantage over 
cash bidding: it may avoid direct wealth effects, since 
it does not require examiners to pay out of pocket to 
bid. With a winning bid, the examiner simply agrees to 
take less than 100% of the initial auction portfolio as 
her incentive pay package. On the other hand, bidding 
is capped because no examiner could discount the 
portfolio by more than 100 percent. A potential draw-
back is that heavy discounting in the bidding process 
may leave the winning bidder with too small a portfolio 
to offer sufficient incentive for diligent regulation. 
There may be good reason therefore to cap the bidding 
at less than 100 percent.74 
The pluses and minuses of cash bidding are just 
the mirror image of portfolio bidding. With cash bid-
ding, the magnitude of the performance incentives 
built into the initial auction portfolio would not be di-
minished, since the winning bidder takes the regulato-
ry assignment with the initial auction portfolio intact, 
undiscounted. However, because examiners would 
have to pay out of pocket to bid, the varying wealth of 
                                                 
74 Tiebreaking rules would be required. A number of rules 
could be imagined, such as ties going to incumbent examiners, or 
agency heads could decide. On general issue of tiebreakers, see 
Adam M. Samaha, "On Law’s Tiebreakers," 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1661 (2010). 
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individual examiners might affect auction outcomes. 
Since examiner wealth is unlikely to be relevant to the 
efficiency of the regulatory allocation decision, large 
wealth effects might corrupt the allocation process.  
One potential solution is to put an upper bound 
on the cash bidding. If the dollar values involved in an 
auction are small, then wealth effects are likely to be 
correspondingly small. But the tighter the range of 
bidding, the lower would be the potential for differenti-
ation among examiners and the less expected turnover 
in assignments. Moreover, arbitrarily capping the bid 
amounts would create difficult choices when two or 
more examiners are willing to pay the maximum 
amount. With too low a cap, supervisors are left with 
the allocation problem they started with.75  
A final consideration is the possibility of per-
verse bidding. As more fully discussed in the next Part, 
an examiner may pursue assignment to a specific 
bank for private motives unrelated to adding regulato-
ry value to the bank.76 For example, she may bid with 
an eye to the revolving door, wishing to enhance her 
prospects for future employment with a specific 
                                                 
75 Another way to ameliorate wealth effects is with borrow-
ing. In theory, if an examiner could demonstrate that her supervi-
sory assignment to a particular bank were a valuable asset, lend-
ers should be willing to finance the acquisition of the asset. How-
ever, credit markets may not work effectively in this situation. 
Besides valuation issues, the asset acquired with the loan pro-
ceeds must be capable of being collateralized. An examiner might 
have a difficult time demonstrating the source of potential value 
to a prospective lender. Information about the regulated bank, the 
regulatory options, and so forth may be confidential and highly 
sensitive. In fact, the regulator may be forbidden from disclosing 
to anyone, especially to other banks. This scenario may also cre-
ate a conflict of interest: one bank lends based on the ability of 
examiners to better supervise another bank. Finally, if the exam-
iner defaulted on the loan, the lender would not be able to liqui-
date the asset to satisfy the debt.  
76 See infra Part IV.B. 
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bank.77 Cash bidding deters perverse bidding, while 
portfolio bidding may exacerbate it. Cash bidding 
would effect a penalty by demanding both a high cash 
bid in order to win the assignment, and then saddling 
the examiner with the full amount of the initial auction 
portfolio, with the attendant risk of large losses for lax 
regulation. With portfolio bidding, on the other hand, 
the perverse bidder would be willing to offer a high 
discount on the initial auction portfolio, because it 
both improves her chances of winning the assignment 
and reduces the potential losses from lax regulation. 
We discuss ways to deter perverse bidding in the next 
Part. To the extent it remains a problem, cash bidding 
would be superior to portfolio bidding, all other things 
being equal. 
Whether bids take the form of cash or portfolio 
discounts, the auction would encourage research by 
examiners into the quality of the assets they are bid-
ding for. We leave it to the regulatory agencies to de-
termine the optimal auction process. Higher-ups are 
likely to have valuable information about specific 
banks, about the need for particular compensation 
strategies for specific banks or types of banks, experi-
ence with a range of compensation practices, and so 
on. This expertise should be brought to bear in design-
ing the auction process. 
 
C. Improved Matching 
In this Section we explain the mechanics of the 
improved examiner matching that is the central aim of 
our proposal. 
 
                                                 
77 See id. Other perverse bidding motivations include insider 
trading motivations and a desire for leisure. Id.  
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1. Signaling Information and Skill 
Examiners may have ex ante preferences as to 
which bank they will oversee. They may have varying 
degrees of knowledge or expertise with respect to dif-
ferent banks. They may have different tastes for risk or 
other factors. Insofar as these factors vary across ex-
aminers in valuable ways from a regulatory perspec-
tive, then an auction system can help increase regula-
tory efficiency.78 For example, an examiner’s special 
expertise, experience, skill, personality, information, or 
risk preferences may enable her to be especially effec-
tive at regulating a particular bank. She may possess 
bank-specific information about business methods, 
management, value, risk, regulatory needs, receptive-
ness to regulatory oversight, and so on. To the extent 
her particular attributes would add regulatory value to 
a given bank, this should motivate her to bid aggres-
sively for that bank, since she would share in the val-
ue she adds to the bank through her conscientious 
supervision. She would bid more for that bank as-
signment than for other available assignments, and 
she would bid more for that assignment than her com-
petitors would. 
Bidding can help reveal examiners’ bank-specific 
information or skills or preferences and sort examiners 
accordingly.79 If well designed, the auction process can 
help align bank- and examiner-specific attributes to 
                                                 
78 By contrast, if each examiner was equally qualified for each 
regulatory assignment and stood to gain or lose the same, then 
the auction would be of no value, since it would not reveal any-
thing other than auction skill or perhaps risk preferences in auc-
tions of the various examiners.  
79 To generalize, this feature means the auction system is like-
ly to work only when there is some specific linkage between the 
work done and firm-specific values. For instance, it is unlikely to 
work well for the regulation of clean air, but it might for patent 
regulation, where there may be direct measures of social gains 
and losses from patent decisions. 
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promote desired regulatory outcomes. Consider two 
different scenarios where the auction approach may 
prove useful. In the first, call it “information forcing,” 
Examiner 1 may bid for the supervisory assignment of 
Bank A or Bank B. She believes strongly that Bank A 
is more likely to default than Bank B, even in the face 
of strong regulatory oversight. Based on this private 
information, Examiner 1 might be less willing to su-
pervise Bank A, since she would bear some of the con-
sequences from bank failure. Accordingly, Examiner 1 
would not bid aggressively to supervise Bank A, and 
therefore the “price” to the agency of procuring super-
vision for Bank A would rise relative to Bank B.  
In the second scenario, call it “skill matching,” 
Examiner 2 is more confident of her ability to super-
vise Bank A and reduce its risk of default than Exam-
iner 1. This could be because Examiner 2 believes she 
has better skill or better information than Examiner 1, 
or is less susceptible to capture, for example. Whatever 
the case, the auction would help incorporate these fac-
tors into the allocation process. Examiner 2 would be 
willing to make a lower bid than Examiner 1 to super-
vise Bank A, because she would capture more upside 
from her regulatory choices in that supervisory role.  
In both cases, the price signal provides valuable 
information about examiners and banks. If there is 
reason to believe that the information generated by 
agency heads using a fiat model of allocation is insuffi-
cient to optimize the matching process, then an auc-
tion system may improve the process. Agency heads 
could be biased by personalities or politics; or they 
might have weak incentives to invest in the optimal 
matching because of their own compensation system 
or the weakness of reputational constraints. Examin-
ers too might not have incentives to convey infor-
mation about skill, fit, or risk tolerance to higher ups, 
since there is little to gain from improved matching. 
They also might be unable to do so effectively, since 
the information might be costly to convey, either be-
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cause of the biases of higher ups or the complexity of 
the information itself. 
 
2. Countering Incumbent Bias 
Another advantage of using our portfolio-based 
price mechanism to assign examiners to banks is that 
it may help to counter the bias of incumbent examin-
ers by facilitating their replacement.  
Imagine an examiner who has worked on site for 
a particular bank for several years, but now has to bid 
on assignments every year or every few years. That ex-
aminer will likely have a significant edge over other ex-
aminers in bidding, given her likely informational ad-
vantages.80 But if examiners enjoy the upside and bear 
the downside from their regulatory choices, then an-
other examiner may be able to offer a lower bid if the 
current examiner were biased by familiarity or cap-
tured in some other way.  
For instance, assume that Bank A has a 30 per-
cent chance of default, but incumbent Examiner 1 un-
derestimates the risk (believing, say, there is only a 10 
percent chance) and thinks there is little she can do to 
reduce that risk. Examiner 2, in contrast, accurately 
estimates the chance of default, and believes he can 
reduce the risk to less than 10 percent. Because exam-
iner pay is tied to the value of Bank A’s debt (and equi-
ty) under our compensation scheme, Examiner 2 can 
expect to gain more than Examiner 1 in this situation 
from the price appreciation in Bank A’s debt. Accord-
ingly, Examiner 2 should be able to win the assign-
ment. Examiner 2 would likely be willing to accept a 
lower-value (ex ante) portfolio of the bank’s debt and 
equity securities than Examiner 1, provided Examiner 
2 sees clearly the prospective gain in debt value from 
                                                 
80 Of course, this advantage should be likely no more than the 
status quo, which, for lack of a better phrase, biases in favor of 
the status quo.  
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reduced risk at Bank A. Incumbent Examiner 1's bias, 
on the other hand, enables her to see only a smaller 
gain. She would therefore be less willing to accept an 
ex ante lower-value portfolio. In this way, the low bid-
der is likely to be the regulator best able to identify 
and implement gains from regulatory action.81 
Note that this debiasing effect of our regulatory 
auction augments the debiasing work already being 
accomplished with our incentive pay structure. The 
debt-heavy portfolio of bank securities already helps 
debias incumbent Examiner 1 directly because the 
trading price of a bank’s debt securities reflects risk 
taking at the bank. If Examiner 1 privately underesti-
mates the risk of default of Bank A, the debt trading 
prices of Bank A should offer some corrective. Also the 
debt-heavy mix means that Examiner 1 has less to 
gain from permitting the Bank to pursue risky strate-
gies than the CEO does. But these incentives might be 
insufficient if Examiner 1 does not have good infor-
mation about risk or potential regulatory fixes, or is 
incapable of processing the information accurately. As 
noted above, this could be because of various biases 
that arise from working at a particular bank. The as-
signment auction offers an additional mechanism to 
address incumbent bias. 
 
D. The Role of Discretion 
We do not view auction outcomes as necessarily 
the dispositive factor in regulatory assignments. Auc-
tions would reveal information to supervisors that 
would be valuable in pursuing optimal resource alloca-
                                                 
81 Note the crucial role of the debt-equity portfolio in the re-
verse auction mechanics. If the loss to either examiner from Bank 
A’s default were simply a flat loss of $100, then incumbent Exam-
iner 1 could be expected to make the lower bid, since Examiner 1 
would have an expected value of default of minus $10, while Ex-
aminer 2’s expected value of default would be minus $30. This 
would merely reinforce any bias from incumbency.  
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tion. At the same time, supervisors will also have their 
own valuable information and experience to bring to 
the assignment process. Some discretion is therefore 
appropriate. In terms of building discretion into our 
auction-based assignment process, the existing gov-
ernment procurement process offers a useful example.  
 
1. Negotiated Procurement 
In conventional government contracting, negoti-
ated procurement is preferable to sealed bidding when 
it may be necessary to conduct discussions with bid-
ders or assignments may turn on non-price considera-
tions.82 Examiner assignment seems analogous. Given 
the familiarity among examiners and their supervisors, 
it would seem odd to rely solely on examiner bids with 
no further communication relating to assignments. 
Similarly, given supervisors’ knowledge and experience 
with their examiners, non-price considerations might 
plausibly be part of the assignment process. 
Because a more discretionary approach may 
lead to undesired favoritism, existing procurement 
regulations include a number of safeguards, some 
form of which may also be suitable for examiner as-
signments. Negotiated procurement proceeds in stages 
that are transparent to all the bidders.83 The initial 
Request for Proposals (RFP) explains the agency’s 
need, the anticipated terms and conditions of the con-
tract, information that the bidder must include in a 
proposal, and the factors that will be used to evaluate 
the proposals and award the contract. The contracting 
officer evaluates bids based not only on price, but also 
on each bidder’s past contract performance and its 
                                                 
82 The extensive rules for government auctions, known as 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), can be fond here: 
https://www.acquisition.gov/far/current/pdf/FAR.pdf. 
83 For example, excluded bidders are notified of their exclu-
sion. See id. 
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proposed technical approach to the project at issue. 
She then identifies the best proposals for further dis-
cussion. 
“Discussion” is hardly a casual affair in negoti-
ated procurement.84 Instead, it is subject to a number 
of regulatory constraints to assure it is not used to fa-
vor one bidder over another.85 The stated purpose of 
discussion is to maximize the best value for the gov-
ernment, and toward that end, to give bidders an op-
portunity to revise their bids to be more competitive. 
Discussion must be “meaningful.” The agency “shall . . 
. indicate to . . . each offeror still being considered for 
award, significant weaknesses, deficiencies, and other 
aspects of its proposal . . . that could, in the opinion of 
the contracting officer, be altered or explained to en-
hance materially the proposal’s potential for award.”86 
                                                 
84 As the Federal Acquisition Regulation explains: 
 
Negotiations are exchanges, in either a competitive or sole 
source environment, between the Government and offerors, 
that are undertaken with the intent of allowing the offeror to 
revise its proposal. These negotiations may include bargain-
ing. Bargaining includes persuasion, alteration of assump-
tions and positions, give-and-take, and may apply to price, 
schedule, technical requirements, type of contract, or other 
terms of a proposed contract. When negotiations are conduct-
ed in a competitive acquisition, they take place after estab-
lishment of the competitive range and are called discussions. 
 
See id. 
85 The contracting officer may not (1) engage in conduct that 
favors one offeror over another; (2) reveal an offeror’s technical 
solution; (3) reveal an offeror’s price without permission; (4) dis-
close the names of persons providing information about the offe-
ror’s past performance; or (5) furnish sensitive source selection 
information. See FAR § 15.306(e). 
86 See id. While each bidder’s pricing information is confiden-
tial, the agency can inform a bidder that its offer is too high or too 
low and explain how the agency came to that conclusion. The 
agency may also inform all bidders that it has determined a par-
ticular price to be reasonable, and the basis for that analysis. 
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Following discussions, each bidder may submit a final 
revised offer. 
Finally, once the winning bid is selected, the 
contracting officer must document the decision, ana-
lyzing the trade-offs accomplished by the discussions 
and identifying the reasons why the winning bid was 
the most advantageous to the agency.87  
 
2. Application to Examiner Assignment 
A similar transparent negotiation process could 
work for examiner assignments as well.88 Along with 
setting each bank’s initial auction portfolio, supervi-
sors could generate a written description of the specific 
features of each regulatory assignment, including the 
nature of the bank’s lending and other activities, the 
appropriate type and level of experience for examiner-
bidders, the expected size of the examination team 
that would supervise the bank, and so on. After culling 
the most promising bids, supervisors could engage in 
discussion with bidders in order to assist each bidder 
in making her most competitive bid. As with outside 
procurement, documentation of the choice of examiner 
for each bank would operate as an important check on 
favoritism and also make clear the agency’s priorities 
with respect to examiner assignments. 
Government procurement may not be the perfect 
model for examiner assignment auctions, since pro-
curement involves pure outsourcing. Examiners and 
their supervisors likely have far better information 
about each other and the bank supervisory assign-
ments at issue than contracting officers and outside 
                                                 
87 See id. 
88
 We are not suggesting this process is perfect. There are 
many criticisms of government procurement, and the process has 
evolved over time in response to experience and learning. An auc-
tion system for regulatory assignments should take account of 
these lessons and adapt them to the particular context.   
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bidders have about each other or the work up for bid. 
So a more streamlined process for examiner assign-
ments may be appropriate. Also given bank confidenti-
ality issues, transparency of the assignment process 
should not extend to the public at large without proce-
dures in place to address this concern. However, 
transparency within the regulatory agencies would still 
be important for assuring fair and impartial assign-
ments. Familiarity among supervisors and examiners 
might otherwise breed favoritism, and the entire point 
of the auction process would be frustrated. 
Although we think the experience with govern-
ment procurement suggests a role for the discretionary 
consideration of non-price factors in examiner assign-
ment auctions, this increases the risk that factors un-
related to regulatory efficiency could be introduced. 
There is no a priori way to address this issue. Agencies 
will need to be sensitive to it as they implement an 
auction system. Given the uncertainties, we suggest a 
series of small-scale experiments, perhaps running 
simulations or starting with just a few banks and a few 
top examiners. The learning from these preliminary 
trials could be used to develop a broader auction sys-
tem. 
Finally, banks come in all shapes, sizes, and lev-
els of importance from a regulatory perspective. Ac-
cordingly, different auction mechanisms may be ap-
propriate depending on a particular bank’s character-
istics. Large, important banks, known as systemically 
important financial institutions (SIFIs), might warrant 
a much different and more complicated auction pro-
cess than local community banks. A risk-based auc-
tion design system might also make some sense. 
 
IV. QUALIFICATIONS AND OBJECTIONS 
 This Part offers some qualifications and ad-
dresses potential objections to our proposal. As we 
have noted elsewhere, we are confident that there are 
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many more details to be worked out by agency heads 
and others within the regulatory agencies. Our goal is 
merely to address the most significant potential obsta-
cles in order to show that our auction approach is 
worth serious consideration. 
 
A. Biases in Bidding and Beyond 
Though we earlier detailed certain biases that 
could impede effective fiat decision making within or-
ganizational hierarchies, auctions are not free of bias 
either. Our move to a market mechanism simply 
moves potential bias or decision-making problems 
from the boss to the employee—from the decider (in a 
fiat model) to the bidder (in a market model). For ex-
ample, a bidder may be overly confident about her 
ability or fit, such that her winning bid may be too low. 
Her mistaken self-assessment may thus result in 
suboptimal assignments.89  
Studies of actual internal prediction markets 
identify potential biases that might also affect our as-
signment auction.90 Google’s internal prediction mar-
kets show evidence of optimism bias among those em-
ployees trading: traded contracts tied to optimistic 
                                                 
89 Note that this bias of a single bidder would likely affect a 
number of matches, and not just the biased bidder’s assignment. 
90 Though internal prediction markets are different in im-
portant respects from our regulatory resource allocation auction, 
there may still be useful lessons in analyzing the performance of 
these prediction markets. Internal prediction markets are typical-
ly structured as continuous double-blind auctions, like spot mar-
kets. Our auction, by contrast, would occur only periodically; 
there would be no continuous trading of regulatory assignments. 
Also prediction markets typically trade contracts whose ultimate 
payoff is not affected by the behavior of the bidders. Our auction 
by contrast is designed to induce certain behavior by a winning 
bidder by having the payoffs from her contract vary with her regu-
latory performance. We keep these differences in mind as we at-
tempt to translate findings from internal prediction market stud-
ies to our auction context.  
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outcomes were overpriced by ten percentage points.91 
Newer Google employees were the most susceptible, 
overbidding in reaction to upward trends in Google’s 
stock price; employees with more experience on the job 
and more trading experience were less susceptible to 
this bias.92 
One can easily imagine a similar bias affecting 
examiner assignment auctions. An inexperienced ex-
aminer might overestimate both her abilities and the 
possibilities for value-increasing regulatory changes at 
particular banks. These misestimations would cause 
the examiner to underbid, perhaps allowing her to win 
an assignment but one that might not be an optimal 
match. 
Prediction markets also exhibit the long-shot bi-
as, overpricing extremely unlikely outcomes.93 Again, 
one could imagine an examiner—especially a less ex-
perienced one—overvaluing the bleak turnaround pro-
spects for a shaky bank and therefore underbidding to 
win the assignment. 
Having staked her claim to a particular regulato-
ry assignment through aggressive bidding, an examin-
er may compound her biases in her approach to su-
pervision. Say, for example, that an examiner wins an 
assignment through a bidding strategy based on her 
overly optimistic pre-auction assessment of the poten-
tial for value-increasing regulatory changes at a given 
bank. Having won the assignment, the examiner may 
feel committed to that view of the bank, which may af-
fect her regulatory choices going forward. Now invested 
in her value-increasing regulatory strategy—which 
might involve more or less aggressive oversight—she 
may credit information that affirms her earlier as-
sessment, but she may reject disconfirming infor-
mation. This phenomenon of escalating commitment is 
                                                 
91 Cowgill, Wolfers & Zitzewitz at 1. 
92 See id. at __. 
93 Wolfers & Zitzewitz at 117. 
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well understood by social psychologists and organiza-
tional behaviorists.94 Though it could plausibly affect 
examiners even under the current system—examiners 
commit to regulatory strategies regardless of the as-
signment mechanism—it may be especially worrisome 
in the auction context, where the examiner has essen-
tially made a financial investment in her regulatory as-
signment through a competitive process. The auction 
might cause her to make a stronger and earlier com-
mitment to her regulatory strategy than she would un-
der the status quo. 
Regulatory agencies and other buyers of labor 
have ways to reduce these problems, however, as a 
rich auction design literature describes,95 and as exist-
ing internal market arrangements illustrate.96 That 
these problems are known is a first step toward ame-
liorating their costs. Biases can be identified from the 
data and monitored, and auctions and other features 
of work can be adjusted to reduce them. For instance, 
by keeping data about bidding and performance, high-
er-ups can identify any systematic pathologies of the 
bidding process, and tweak the auction design to rem-
edy them. Moreover, the agency could rely on its own 
information to help make corrections. For instance, if 
agency heads (who would otherwise have allocative au-
thority) have information suggesting flaws in particular 
bids, there is no reason for them to ignore this infor-
mation. Government contracting operates this way. 
Outsourced functions do not necessarily go to the low-
                                                 
94 See Barry M. Staw, The Escalation of Commitment to a 
Course of Action, 6 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 577 (1981).   
95 See, e.g., PAUL KLEMPERER, ED. THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF 
AUCTIONS (1999); PAUL KLEMPERER, AUCTIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
(2004); VIJAY KRISHNA, AUCTION THEORY (2002); J. Riley &  W. 
Samuelson, “Optimal auctions,” 71 AM. ECON. REV. 381 (1981); P. 
Milgrom and R. Weber, "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive 
Bidding," 50 ECONOMETRICA 1089 (1982). 
96 See, e.g., Michael Abramowitz & M. Todd Henderson, supra 
note __ at __. 
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est bidder, especially if there is evidence of error in the 
bid – say, it is way too low given the available infor-
mation about the bidder. Viewed this way, internal 
auctions are merely a way of broadening the range of 
potential outcomes that would be made by a fiat sys-
tem.  
In any event, the potential problem is unlikely to 
be systematic: after the overconfident employee realiz-
es losses on the project she underbid, she is less likely 
to persist in the biased belief that caused the errant 
bid.  
  
B. Perverse Bidding Motivations 
So far, the only bidding motivation we have con-
sidered is the examiner’s potential to add regulatory 
value to banks. If pay-for-performance algorithms are 
well designed (that is, effective at identifying the public 
interest and inducing examiners to pursue it), and ex-
aminers are motivated to maximize their payouts un-
der the algorithms, then a well-designed auction can 
help elicit private information about regulatory effi-
ciency. But an auction might also give examiners op-
portunities to pursue interests other than the public 
interest.  
In this Section, we discuss possible harmful mo-
tivations for bidding, and we offer some ideas about 
mitigation. An examiner might bid for an assignment 
to enhance her prospects for future employment with 
her regulated bank; to enhance her income by trading 
on inside information about her supervised bank; or to 
accrue other benefits, such as leisure from supervising 
a low-risk bank. Or examiners might collude to avoid 
having to compete for assignments. 
Each of these problems is endemic to any sys-
tem of regulatory resource allocation; it does not origi-
nate with our auction proposal. The potential to ma-
nipulate regulation to serve private interests is already 
a serious concern. By eliciting additional information 
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from examiners (individually and as a group) on the 
potential costs and benefits of various regulatory as-
signments, our auction proposal can supplement ex-
isting mechanisms that deal with these issues.  
 
1. Bidding for the Revolving Door 
The revolving door may offer a significant source 
of future income for an examiner. A particular bank, 
for example, may develop a reputation for its generosi-
ty to its bank examiners with respect to post-
government employment opportunities. With assign-
ment auctions, a bank might even actively encourage 
this perception in order to attract friendly examiners. 
In this scenario, the bank essentially perverts the auc-
tion process, utilizing it to screen for lenient examin-
ers. 
Even absent opportunistic plotting by banks, 
situations may arise in which potential revolving-door 
benefits swamp any regulatory value that examiners 
could add to banks through conscientious and innova-
tive regulation. One can imagine, even absent any ma-
nipulation of the process, that the revolving door prob-
lem gets worse the longer an examiner supervises the 
same bank. The bankers get to know the examiner and 
vice versa; familiarity leads to implicit or explicit prom-
ises of quid pro quos (future employment for current 
lax oversight). At some point, the examiner’s desire to 
protect her investment in her revolving-door future 
may trump other considerations, such that her win-
ning bid may bear no relation to her ability to add reg-
ulatory value. Her revolving-door exit may be worth 
more to her than any other examiner’s ability to add 
regulatory value to the bank. These revolving door ef-
fects offer a new flavor of race-to-the-bottom regulatory 
competition.  
There are ways of reducing these problems, 
however. Most obviously, examiners’ incentive pay 
should provide a natural corrective. If the examiner 
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bears the consequences of her own lax regulation, 
then the aggregate costs of her revolving door bidding 
strategy would increase. The downside of quid pro quo 
laxity is currently very low; performance pay increases 
the downside, while regular bidding for assignments 
subjects this perverse bidding strategy to continuing 
external constraint. 
Systematically beating the system through re-
volving-door bidding strikes us as unlikely and, in any 
event, relatively easy for higher-up regulators to detect 
and address. Should revolving-door problems increase, 
the variable pay component could be increased, vest-
ing periods could be lengthened, or auction factors 
changed.  
Supervisors could exercise their discretion in the 
assignment process even more finely. Auctions can 
bring new information to examiner rotation decisions, 
for example and facilitate tailoring by individual bank 
or examiner. Under the current system of mandatory 
rotation, a five-year “term limit” with any given bank 
reduces examiner entrenchment (and thus capture).97 
But trade offs between entrenchment on the one hand 
and expertise and experience on the other might call 
for shortening of the assignment term in the case of a 
specific bank-examiner pair. For example, scrutiny of 
an incumbent examiner’s string of consecutive win-
ning bids for the same bank assignment over several 
years might offer clues about her bidding motivations. 
If her winning bids appear “irrational,”—i.e., she seems 
to be losing money every year overbidding for her fa-
vorite assignment—then something might be amiss. 
Perhaps her bids make sense only when the value of 
her revolving-door exit is included in the calculus.98 
                                                 
97 See supra note __. 
98
 Other less sinister explanations are also possible. Perhaps 
the incumbent values leisure extremely highly, and each year her 
increasing experience and familiarity with the operations of a safe 
(continued next page) 
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Term limit intervention might be appropriate to that 
individual case. 
Less direct interventions are also possible. Auc-
tion bidding could be structured to produce higher 
turnover rates if desired. For example, a bounty could 
be paid for outbidding an incumbent examiner for an 
assignment. This might be necessary to offset the costs 
of overcoming the incumbent’s information advantages 
with respect to the particular bank. A bounty amount 
could be set such that, adjusted by the probability of 
the non-incumbent’s winning of the assignment, it 
would offset the non-incumbent’s investigation costs.99 
Bounty levels could be fine-tuned to reflect increasing 
incumbency advantages expected over time. Informa-
tional asymmetries will be lower for incumbents with 
only one year at a bank compared with five years, for 
example. Bounty levels to induce optimal research in-
centives should be adjusted accordingly.  
More stringent constraints on post-government 
employment could also help. A simple reform would be 
to ban examiners from ever working for banks that 
they have regulated. Another option, either as a com-
pliment or a substitute to a bank-specific ban, would 
be to require a waiting period before an examiner is 
permitted to work for any bank. The delay would re-
duce the present value of revolving door rewards and 
therefore deter the revolving-door problem on the mar-
gin. Reducing revolving door rewards, however—
through any of the mechanisms described here—may 
may require agencies to increase examiner compensa-
tion to attract the same talent, since such constraints 
would reduce the overall payoff from being a regulator. 
                                                                                                             
bank assure her a relatively uneventful assignment with her fa-
vored bank.  
99 For instance, if an examiner gets $10,000 for winning a new 
assignment, and an examiner believes she has a 20% chance of 
doing so for a particular bank, she would rationally devote up to 
$2000 in resources to develop her bid. 
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But again, this issue is not specific to auctions as an 
assignment mechanism. Revolving door problems exist 
regardless of the assignment method; they are inher-
ent in any regulatory environment.  
Auctions offer a number of promising approach-
es to addressing entrenchment, and with a term limit 
in place, auctions should do no worse than the current 
assignment system, and may likely do better.  
 
2. Bidding for Inside Information 
Because examiners have access to private in-
formation about the banks they supervise, an auction 
system for regulatory assignments coupled with com-
pensation in the form of bank securities may offer 
temptations toward insider trading or other misuse of 
nonpublic information. 
Though portfolio compensation under our pro-
posal would be in the form of phantom securities that 
could not be sold in securities markets, examiners giv-
en specific stakes in the market movements of their 
banks’ securities might find other ways to profit from 
inside information. They might simply leak nonpublic 
information at opportune times in anticipation of cash-
ing out a tranche of phantom securities. Or they might 
sell information to others who trade. But, as with the 
revolving-door problem noted above, this is not a prob-
lem specific to allocation mechanisms. In addition, 
work rules already exist to constrain this type of gar-
den-variety insider trading. To the extent that our use 
of phantom securities may marginally exacerbate this 
problem, agencies may wish to augment their preven-
tive efforts or increase the penalties for violations.100 
                                                 
100 For instance, examiners paid in part in phantom securities 
might pay more attention to bank stock and debt prices than they 
do now. This saliency might then tempt them to engage in insider 
trading of actual bank securities.   
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Auctioning off work assignments offers addition-
al nefarious possibilities. Various types of sophisticat-
ed investors might desire inside information about a 
particular bank. Besides those looking for a trading 
advantage, potential acquirers or targets of the bank 
or parties involved in other major transactions with 
the bank may seek nonpublic information about the 
bank. These parties might be willing to finance an ex-
aminer’s bid for supervisory rights over the given bank 
in order to gain access to information. Although some 
version of this may be possible already—third parties 
could try to influence examiner appointments or simp-
ly approach existing examiners—auctions may offer a 
more direct and less easily detected method of influ-
encing examiner assignments for shady purposes.  
To some extent, a negotiated bidding process 
could deter this species of perverse bidding.101 Not on-
ly do supervisors already know senior examiners per-
sonally, they could test the bona fides of examiner bids 
during the negotiation process. In addition, higher ups 
could more closely monitor newly auction-assigned ex-
aminers ex post for evidence of illicit motives inimical 
to improved regulatory outcomes. Existing sanctions 
for revealing confidential bank information could be 
increased. Whether the additional costs of this moni-
toring and enforcement outweigh the benefits from 
more efficient matching of examiners with banks is an 
empirical question which only experience can settle. 
We see no apriori reason to expect that these auction-
related costs should necessarily swamp the benefits. 
 
3. Bidding for Other Private Values 
Another species of private value is what me 
might broadly call “leisure.” Certain regulatory as-
signments might be viewed as easier or cushier than 
others. If true, we would expect these to attract exam-
                                                 
101 See supra Part III.D. 
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iners with a preference for leisure or other characteris-
tics of a particular bank. Although this might seem 
like an odd factor for regulatory higher ups to consider 
in allocating resources, there are good reasons why 
they should. Assuming examiners have heterogeneous 
preferences for leisure or various types of risk, allow-
ing examiners to price these preferences should im-
prove regulatory outcomes. Harder working, risk-
preferring examiners will be more likely to win assign-
ments where those preferences will be valued, while 
more easy going, risk-averse examiners will sort to 
banks where those attributes are valued. It is im-
portant to reiterate here the work that compensation 
contracts do, since examiners of all sorts will bear the 
downside risks of their work. So long as this is true, 
then sorting should be more or less efficient. Unless 
these preferences can be transmitted efficiently in a 
bureaucratic structure that allocates talent by fiat, 
auctions will improve the efficiency of assignments by 
creating a market for talent allocation. 
An analogy can be found in the market for cor-
porate executives. Executive compensation contracts 
more or less reward executives for performance. The 
result is that risk-preferring executives should tend to 
work for high-risk companies, like technology start 
ups or other volatile companies, while risk-averse ex-
ecutives should take jobs at utilities or other regulated 
industries with greater opportunities to satisfy prefer-
ences for leisure or other non-monetary forms of utili-
ty. This helps ensure a match of talent with needs.  
 
4. Collusive Bidding 
 Examiners are likely to know at least some of 
their fellow examiners quite well, and will be familiar 
with their backgrounds, experience, professional 
strengths, and personal preferences. This environment 
of familiarity may facilitate tacit or explicit collusion in 
bidding. Besides simply knowing one another, examin-
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ers can expect to be repeat players in the periodic as-
signment auctions. Simple game theory tells us that 
these repeat plays facilitate cooperation by offering 
players opportunities to reward each other for past co-
operation or punishing one other for defecting from 
prior understandings.102 For example, examiners might 
agree among themselves as to bank assignments, but 
then offer token auction bidding to camouflage the 
conspiracy. In the absence of competitive bidding, ex-
aminers as a group would likely do better overall than 
if they competed for assignments.103  
Of course, the wider is the conspiracy, the more 
difficult it is to coordinate ex ante or enforce ex post. 
So an ambitious collusion scheme would likely fall of 
its own weight. And a conspiracy involving just a few 
examiners would likely be ineffective at altering auc-
tion outcomes. Moreover, collusion is also possible 
when regulatory resources are allocated by fiat. De-
pending on the size and probability of obtaining favors 
from the regulated, the stakes may be just as high. 
Supervisors would have several possible strate-
gies to fight collusion. These can be found in the poli-
cies and procedures of the Antitrust Division at the 
Department of Justice, which polices commercial mar-
kets for anti-competitive behavior. Banking regulators 
could offer rewards for whistleblowers, conduct ran-
dom audits of bidding processes, impose large penal-
ties (e.g., from termination to civil and criminal penal-
ties) for those caught colluding, and so on. The specific 
approaches to policing our examiner assignment auc-
                                                 
102 For a general discussion of the problems and potential 
cures for collusion in auctions, see Yoram Bachrach, et al., “A 
Cooperative Approach to Collusion in Auctions,” 10 ACM SIGECOM 
EXCHANGES 17 (2011). 
103 A mismatch of examiners to banks would mean worse per-
formance of banks’ debt-equity portfolios overall, but each exam-
iner’s portfolio would be larger without competitive bidding. As-
suming the latter dynamic dominated the former, then examiners 
as a group would benefit from collusion.  
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tion are best left to the agencies and the experts at the 
DOJ. A key point is that the potential for collusive be-
havior is likely no worse than in many commercial 
markets, where the potential for collusion is insuffi-
cient to recommend fiat allocation of the resources at 
issue.  
 
C. Examination Team Microstructure 
For simplicity, our proposal focuses on the ex-
aminer in charge, but for larger banks, the examina-
tion process involves a team of examiners working un-
der the examiner in charge. For these examination 
teams, assignment decisions at the level below the 
head examiner may matter a great deal, since the ex-
aminer in charge will have an imperfect ability to moti-
vate and monitor examiners working on the team. Ex-
aminer teams are undoubtedly greater than the sum of 
their parts. Examiners on a team need to work togeth-
er, sometimes in high-pressure situations, so intangi-
ble factors—“chemistry”—will matter a great deal. 
A simple but naïve approach would be to just ex-
tend our incentive compensation scheme and our allo-
cation approach down the hierarchy. That is, senior 
and junior examiners could all be independently as-
signed to bank teams through the auction mechanism. 
But given the importance of team chemistry, this ap-
proach would be less than ideal. The examiner in 
charge may reasonably expect some input into the 
composition of her team. 
There are better alternatives. Examination teams 
without a lead examiner could be assigned by fiat by 
agency higher ups, and then potential examiners in 
charge could bid for a particular bank/examination 
team combination. The pre-auction team assignments 
could be made by experience, fit, random draw, or a 
mix of factors, just as they are today. 
Alternatively, lower-level examiners could bid for 
assignments after examiners-in-charge had been as-
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signed to banks. So the lower-level examiners would 
be bidding for lead examiner/bank combinations. And 
examiners in charge and/or regulatory higher-ups 
could exercise some discretion in tailoring teams, 
based in part on these auction results. However as-
signed, the approach would ideally incentivize individ-
ual examiners and generate suitable matches without 
impeding the lead examiner’s ability to manage the ex-
amination team.  
Numerous mixed strategies could be employed 
on an experimental basis to determine the optimal ap-
proach. For example, some teams could be assigned 
independent of the lead examiners, some could be 
chosen after a lead-examiner auction, and so on. We 
do not have special wisdom on which of these strate-
gies would be most successful at producing high-
quality examination teams. We are confident that effi-
cient and effective strategies may emerge with judi-
cious experimentation. 
 
D. Why It Has Not Happened Yet 
If this is such a sensible idea, one might ask, 
why has it never been tried? One possible explanation 
relates to a precondition we described earlier: bidders 
must have skin in the game.104 An auction system can 
work only if examiners bear the costs and capture the 
gains from the regulatory assignments they are bid-
ding on. Since they are not currently paid for perfor-
mance, this may explain the lack of experimentation 
with market-based allocation mechanisms. Without 
some skin the game for examiners, bidding for regula-
tory assignments would not be useful and could be 
counterproductive. 
Skin in the game does not necessarily have to 
involve direct financial rewards, however. Insofar as 
examiners and other regulators gain or lose reputation 
                                                 
104 See supra Part III.A. 
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as a result of their performance, an auction could cap-
italize on this reputational stake and improve regulato-
ry assignments. The absence of such experimentation 
may therefore indicate the low intensity of these non-
monetary incentives or other factors. For instance, 
agency heads may not have sufficiently strong reputa-
tional incentives to pursue optimal regulation. Or 
agency heads may also be risk averse. A failed auction 
system may cost them a great deal in terms of employ-
ee relations, their political fortunes, or other reputa-
tional factors. Even if a successful reform offered 
symmetrical rewards, such rewards would have to be 
discounted by the ex ante likelihood of failure. More 
generally, any social gains would be widely dispersed. 
In short, incentives to innovate may be lacking. 
 
E. Thinking Beyond the Agency 
Assuming these various potential pitfalls can be 
overcome, it becomes possible to imagine expanding 
the auction beyond existing examiners within a partic-
ular federal agency and the banks supervised by that 
agency.105 One can envision a broader assignment 
auction to encompass banks and bank examiners 
across the various federal bank regulatory agencies. 
This could improve regulation because thicker markets 
generally promote better matching. More banks and 
examiners in the auction pool allow for finer tailoring 
of examiner skill and experience to bank supervisory 
needs.106   
Though one might initially see historical as-
signment patterns replicated in the auction process 
                                                 
105 The OCC supervises national banks; the Federal Reserve 
supervises state member banks and bank holding companies; 
and the FDIC supervises state nonmember banks and FDIC-
insured savings banks. FED. DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP., AN EXAMI-
NATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S 24 
(2000). 
106 See ENRICO MORETTI, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF JOBS (2012). 
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across multiple agencies, one could imagine that over 
time, individual examiners might develop expertise re-
lating to banks not traditionally within their agencies’ 
purview in order to take advantage of the broader 
range of regulatory assignments available.  
The next incremental expansion of the regulato-
ry assigment market might even include other finan-
cial regulators within the federal government or within 
the broader range of quasi-public regulators, such as 
the various self-regulatory organizations, or even fur-
ther to new potential regulatory startups. For instance, 
examiners at Finra,107 which regulates broker-dealers, 
could bid for bank examination work if Finra and its 
examiners believed that Finra examiners (of broker-
dealers) could do a better job than current banking 
examiners.108  
As the pool of potential regulatory bidders were 
expanded this way, we would expect the outsourcing 
agency to impose bidding requirements. Sensible re-
quirements would include minimum amounts of train-
ing or experience, bonding, or other rules designed to 
reduce expected decision and error costs. These re-
quirements should be considered carefully, however, 
since they could be used to distort auction outcomes 
to favor incumbent examiners.  
                                                 
107 FINRA is the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. 
108 In fact, as of this writing, Finra is lobbying Congress to 
give it regulatory authority over “investment advisors” under the 
Investment Advisors Act of 1940. Instead of any Congressional 
mandate, the job could be put out to bid. Insofar as Finra, or any 
other bidder, could be assured of bearing the upside and down-
side of its regulatory choices, then this might be a better way of 
allocating the assignment. Although ensuring internalization of 
costs and benefits may be more difficult for a regulatory agency 
than for individual examiners, it is based on something like this 
assumption that Finra, as a privately owned company, is current-
ly permitted to regulate broker-dealers under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. 
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On the other hand, there may be good reasons 
to bias the auction-assignment process in favor of ex-
isting agency examiners. For one, including extra-
agency examiners in the bidders’ pool would increase 
the cost of using the price mechanism compared with 
fiat. In addition, the broader is the range of individuals 
or entities engaged in the bidding, the greater is the 
potential for errors. This cost is reduced if the optimal 
compensation contract can be written, causing the 
parties to fully internalize the costs of their decisions. 
We would expect that the more refined the compensa-
tion contract for examiner services becomes over time, 
the lower the costs of expanding the range of potential 
examiners. In any event, incremental expansions could 
be implemented as we describe, with each stage of ex-
pansion subject to evaluation of its new cost-benefit 
calculus. 
  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Regulatory agencies across the government current-
ly deploy their vast resources based on a command-
and-control model. Agency heads direct particular gov-
ernment employees to do particular work. While the 
assignments are no doubt influenced by the input of 
those who will do the work, as well as assessments by 
their superiors, this process could be improved by cre-
ating a market in which assignments are allocated us-
ing the price mechanism. If regulators reap the bene-
fits of good work and bear the costs of bad work, then 
they can convey information about themselves, their fit 
with particular assignments, and the quality of regu-
lated entities more efficiently through a market than 
they can by lobbying or jawboning agency heads. 
In this paper, we propose auctions for the allocation 
of bank examiners to particular banks. Building off 
our earlier work proposing performance pay for bank-
ers, we show how auctions can improve regulatory effi-
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ciency by improving the initial allocation of examiners 
and combating capture and entrenchment.  
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